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Which of the Preparatory Commission's Latest Proposals 
for the Definition of the Crime of Aggression and the 
Exercise of Jurisdiction Should Be Adopted into the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 17, 1998, the final draft of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (Rome Statute) 1 at the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court (Rome Conference) was completed. The Rome Statute 
established the existence of an International Criminal Court (ICC), 2 "a 
permanent institution" that has "the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern .... "3 
Crimes that fall within the ICC's jurisdiction include genocide,4 
crimes against humanity,5 war crimes,6 and the crime of aggression.7 
These crimes are included because they are the "most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole."8 Except for the 
crime of aggression, the elements of each admissible crime are defined in 
the Rome Statute.9 Apparently, because no consensus for a definition of 
the crime of aggression could be agreed upon at a time near the desired 
completion of the final draft, a qualification was set forth in Article 5(2) 
of the Rome Statute stating that the ICC could "exercise" its jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression once a provision was enacted which "de-
* Copyright© 2001 by Rachel Peirce. 
I. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. NCONF.l83/9 
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
2. See Grant M. Dawson, Defining Substantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdic-
tion of the International Criminal Court: What Is the Crime of Aggression? 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J.INT'L 
& COMP. L. 413 (2000) (citations omitted). 
3. /d. Rome Statute, supra note I, art. I. 
4. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 5(1)(a). 
5. See id. art. 5(1 )(b). 
6. See id. art. 5(1)(c). 
7. See id. art. 5(1)(d). 
8. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 5(1 ). 
9. Articles 6, 7, and 8 contain definitions of the terms genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes, respectively. See id. art. 6-8. 
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fin[ ed] the crime and set[] conditions" of jurisdiction "with respect to 
this crime."10 During the drafting of the Rome Statute, the U.S. strongly 
opposed the inclusion of the crime of aggression because "[t]his issue 
alone could fatally compromise the ICC's future credibility." 11 
This comment briefly describes some of the provisions of the Rome 
Statute that the U.S. opposes along with its reasoning. As demonstrated 
above, the crime of aggression is one of the United States' primary rea-
sons for not signing the Rome Statute. 12 A brief history surrounding this 
crime and an analysis of the latest three proposals set forth by the Pre-
paratory Commission for the International Criminal Court (Preparatory 
Commission) for the definition of aggression and its jurisdiction will be 
discussed. In addition, the question of whether the crime of aggression 
should be excluded altogether will be addressed. Finally, this comment 
will conclude with a discussion about issues surrounding the definition of 
aggression and its jurisdiction, along with the ratification of the Rome 
Statute as a whole. 
II. UNITED STATES' CONCERNS WITH THE ROME STATUTE 
A. Article 12: Personal Jurisdiction 
The United States strongly opposes the far-reaching jurisdiction of 
the ICC over individuals. Currently, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction 
over an accused individual if the alleged perpetrator is a member of a 
state party or if the alleged crime occurred in the territory of a state 
party .13 Due to this provision, any state that has ratified the Rome Statute 
may refer an admissible crime to a prosecutor of the ICC regardless of 
whether the accused individual is a member of a state that ratified the 
Rome Statute. 14 Thus, not only does the "treaty expose[] nonparties in 
ways that parties are not exposed," 15 but the Rome Statme also contra-
dicts customary international law which provides that only parties to a 
treaty are bound to its provisions. 16 Furthermore, due to the broad juris-
diction of Article 12, an incentive exists for states to more willingly ab-
stain from intervention in those "lawful, but highly controversial and in-
herently risky, interventions that the advocates of human rights and 
I 0. /d. art. 5(2). 
II. David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: The United States and 
the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 12, 21 (Jan. 1999). 
12. See generally id. 
13. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 12(1)(a). 
14. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 18. 
15. /d. 
16. See id. 
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world peace so desperately seek from the United States and other mili-
tary powers." 17 
B. Article 13: Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Under Article 13, a state party 18 or the Security Council, pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 19 may refer to an independent 
prosecutor of the ICC cases in which it appears that admissible crimes 
have occurred.20 In addition, a prosecutor may self-initiate and investi-
gate the possible occurrence of a crime.21 One problem inherent in allow-
ing either a prosecutor of the ICC to investigate crimes or a state party to 
refer crimes is that such accusations may be politically motivated against 
certain states, including the United States.22 Because of its widespread 
military involvement in the last century, the United States is an easy tar-
get for those opposed to its foreign policy. Thus, although the Rome 
Statute has set forth provisions to eliminate this concem,23 these proce-
dural safeguards24 are ambiguous and do not provide adequate protection 
for the United States. 
C. Complementary Regime 
During the course of negotiations, the United States stressed the im-
portance of state sovereignty and the need for the ICC to not impinge 
upon this right. 25 A protective device is set forth in Article 17, which 
prohibits the ICC from proceeding with any case within the jurisdiction 
of an implicated state unless the state is incapable or unwilling to deter-
mine if prosecution is necessary.26 In addition, Article 18 imposes further 
restrictions on the ICC's authority to go beyond a state's ability to prose-
cute.27 However, even with these restrictions, the possibility of the ICC 
usurping power from states remains. The larger the territory and the 
greater the number of individuals over which a court may exercise juris-
17. /d. at 19. 
18. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 13(a). 
19. See id. art. 13(b). 
20. See id. art. 13. 
21. See id. art. 13(c). 
22. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
23. See Michael P. Scharf, Results of the Rome Conference for an International Criminal 
Court, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSIGHT, (Aug. 1998) < ltttp:l/wo,nv.asil.orglinsigh23.htm>. 
24. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 18 (explaining that before a prosecutor can investi-
gate, his or her complaint must be approved by three-judge pre-trial chamber, which approval may 
be subject to an interlocutory appeal to an appeals chamber). 
25. See generally Scharf, supra note 23. 
26. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 17. 
27. See id. art. 18. 
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diction, the greater the power and potential for abuse. Thus, when creat-
ing an international court, state sovereignty must remain clearly intact. 
State sovereignty is a vital protection to people and their representation 
and its ideals need to be more strictly safeguarded than currently pro-
vided for in the Rome Statute. 
D. Amendment Provisions 
Articles 121 and 123 set forth the provisions for adding or revising 
the text of the Rome Statute seven years after its enforcement date.28 Ar-
ticle 121 provides that a two-thirds majority of state parties is required to 
approve such an amendment. 29 Once ratified by seven-eighths of the 
State Parties, the enforcement of an amendment may begin one year 
later. 30 
One United States concern with these amendment provisions is that 
in the future, more "serious" crimes could be added to the statute that the 
United States may oppose.31 Of even greater concern is the fact that if a 
state party does not accept an amendment relating to a new or revised 
crime, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction when "committed by that 
State Party's nationals or on its territory."32 Thus, although a state party 
can opt out of new or revised crimes amended into the Rome Statute, a 
nonparty state can be subject to such crimes via Article 12.33 These pro-
visions also violate customary international law because state parties that 
have signed the treaty become immune to jurisdiction of new or revised 
crimes while its provisions bind nonparties. 
E. Manner of Finalization 
The United States delegation proposed many changes to the draft of 
the Rome Statute during the Rome Conference. Many of the proposed 
changes were not made or even addressed. In addition, on the final day 
of the conference, a small number of delegates (not including any U.S. 
delegates) met behind closed doors, making final changes to the Rome 
Statute and finishing at two o'clock in the morning.34 Some of the text of 
the draft statute was changed, including portions previously approved by 
the Committee of the Whole.35 Thus, fearing that numerous issues had 
28. See id. art. 121(1). 
29. See id. art. 121(3). 
30. See id. art. 121(4). 
31. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 18. 
32. Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 121(5). 
33. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 20. 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
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not been sufficiently scrutinized, the United States was concerned with 
the '"take it or leave it' text for a permanent institution of law [that] was 
not subjected to the rigorous review of the Drafting Committee or the 
Committee of the Whole and was rushed to adoption hours later on the 
evening of July 17 without debate."36 In other words, "[s]o many issues 
of fundamental importance remained open in April 1998 that [David 
Scheffer and U.S. delegates] could only approach Rome with 'cautious 
. . "' 17 optimism. -
III. PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome Conference determined 
that the Preparatory Commission, among other tasks, would be responsi-
ble for drafting a proposed provision for the crime of aggression?8 Once 
60 members have ratified the Rome Statute, the International Criminal 
Court becomes effective.39 Once this occurs, proposals regarding the 
crime of aggression must be completed by the end of the first meeting of 
the Assembly of State Parties.40 The Preparatory Collltllission's latest 
proposals for a definition and jurisdiction pertaining to the crime of ag-
gression were released on July 6, 2000.41 
IV. HISTORY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
A. Background 
Throughout history, the question of whether one group of individuals 
has a moral right to commit an act of aggression against another group 
has existed.42 With the onset of the industrial revolution, the world be-
came smaller as technology increased, increasing the need to answer this 
question.43 In 1899, the First Hague Convention responded by attempting 
36. /d. 
37. /d. at 14. 
38. See First Session of the Preparatory Commission (February /6-26, 1999), lNT'L CRIM. 
CT. MONITOR (visited Sept. 12, 2000) <http://www.iccnow.org/html/monitor.htm> (section entitled 
"Introduction"). 
39. See Carl M. Nesser, First Session of the Preparatory Commission (February /6-26, 
1999), INT'LCRIM. CT. MONITOR (visited Sept. 12, 2000) 
<http://www.iccnow.org/html/monitor.htm> (section entitled "Aggression"). 
40. See id. 
41. See U.N. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, 5th Sess., at I, 
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/L.3/Rev.l (2000) [hereinafter Proposed Statute]. 
42. See Linda Jane Springrose, Aggression as a Core Crime in the Rome Statute Establishing 
an International Criminal Court, 1999 ST. LoUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 151, 153 (citing I 
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 167-174 (1986)). 
43. See id. (citing I BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION, THE 
SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 4 (1975)). 
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to curb aggression between states.44 Although not specific in the proce-
dures to be employed, this treaty provided not only for states to try to co-
exist peaceably with one another, but also encouraged settlements of dis-
putes through the process of either mediation or arbitration before a Per-
manent Court of Arbitration.45 Such provisions became more detailed in 
1910 during the Second Hague Convention. However, because the juris-
diction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration was compulsory, many 
countries did not submit disputes to it.46 Although the League of Nations, 
which outlawed war, was formed in part to prevent states from incurring 
the type of destruction imposed upon many nations in World War I, it did 
not prevent the occurrence of World War II.47 
B. Nuremberg 
A new approach was implemented at Nuremberg. Instead of impos-
ing a Versailles-type treaty on all of Germany collectively (as was done 
after World War I), military leaders responsible for the atrocities of 
World War II were tried individually.48 The Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT) of Nuremberg was the governing document 
used, providing for crimes against peace (aggression), crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.49 In addition, the Charter stated that those in-
dividuals tried could not claim as a defense that they were only following 
superior orders.50 The German defense of nullum poena sine lege was 
raised along with the criticism that the crime of aggression was an ex 
post facto law.51 The IMT rejected these notions by citing the precedence 
of past laws and other historic attempts to curb aggression. 52 In addition, 
the IMT distinguished the crime of aggression from other crimes by stat-
ing, "[T]o initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an interna-
tional crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from 
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of 
the whole."53 The Tokyo War Crime Tribunal in the Far East tried Japa-
44. See id. at 154. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. at 155. 
48. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 155. 
49. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 1945 U.S.T. I, 7-8 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. 
50. See id. at 8-9. 
51. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 156-57. 
52. See id. at 157. 
53. /d. (quoting Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where 
they Stand and Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375,452 (1992)). 
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nese leaders for the same crimes as in Nuremberg with similar provisions 
pertaining to the crime of aggression. 54 
C. The United Nations and the Security Council 
In 1945, the United Nations Charter was signed,55 and in 1951 the 
first United Nation's draft regarding the creation of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court was written.56 However, instead of trying persons 
on an individual basis, the U.N. Charter and subsequent U.N. resolutions 
advanced the notion that aggression involves acts of a state entity.57 
Certain U.N. provisions outline the use of force and aggression along 
with the proper role of the Security Council in regulating such force. Ar-
ticle 33 of the U.N. Charter provides that 
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful 
means of their own choice. 58 
In addition, the U.N. Charter allows the Security Council, in its 
judgment, to attempt to persuade parties in a dispute to resolve such mat-
ters by the same means. 59 If the Security Council determines that a threat 
to peace exists, it may, at its discretion, take action60 and encourage the 
states involved61 in the dispute to remedy the situation through the use of 
sanctions or by the imposition of other methods of non-force.62 To use 
force, the Security Council must first determine that such force is essen-
tial to maintain or restore peace.63 Once this requirement is met, the Se-
curity Council may use force as a source of compliance if an aggressive 
state will not settle the dispute through peaceful means64 and if peaceful 
means cannot adequately remedy the situation.65 
In the case of an armed attack by a state, the U.N. Charter allows the 
attacked state to defend itself. However, the attacked state must cease its 
54. /d. 
55. See id. at 159. 
56. See id. at 158. 
57. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 15. 
58. /d. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 33). 
59. See id. 
60. See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 39). 
61. See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 40). 
62. See id. 
63. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 15 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 42). 
64. See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 41). 
65. See id. (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 42). 
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defense once the Security Council intervenes and determines a course of 
action to be taken regarding the matter.66 Thereafter, the Security Coun-
cil may intervene67 at its own discretion.68 
Although the above United Nations provisions furnish guidelines re-
garding the use of force, the definition of what constitutes an "act of ag-
gression" was not determined until the General Assembly passed Resolu-
tion 3314 in 1974.69 The definition includes "the use of armed forces by 
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Char-
ter of the U.N., as set out in this definition."70 The resolution details spe-
cific events that qualify as an act of aggression.71 In addition, this 
resolution only applies to acts of aggression committed by states.72 How-
ever, because the definition of an act of aggression was set forth in a 
resolution, the definition is not binding on its face on the member states 
of the United Nations.73 
D. Drafting the Statute for the ICC 
Starting in 1992, the International Law Commission (ILC) explored 
the question of whether a permanent international court could actually 
exist.74 Because the United States would sign a draft statute of the treaty 
if the provisions were sufficiently aligned with United States priorities, 
United States personnel followed the work of the ILC closely during 
1993.75 Chief among the United States' priorities included specifying 
definitions of war crimes and excluding the crime of aggression.76 Dur-
ing 1997, the United States advocated that the crime of aggression should 
not be included unless the Rome Statute could "define and qualify its in-
clusion properly."77 Although the United States advocated the position 
that the Security Council should refer all cases brought before the ICC, 
66. See id. at 159-60 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 51). 
67. See id. at 159-60 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 51). 
68. See id. at 160 (citing U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42). 
69. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 160 (citation omitted). 
70. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 392, U.N. Doc. N9890 (1974) 
(reprinted in Springrose, supra note 42, at 160). 
71. See id. art. 3. 
72. See Springrose, supra note 43, at 160. 
73. See id. 
7 4. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 12. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. at 12-13. 
77. !d. at 13. 
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rather than through the initiation of a state prosecutor, 78 the U.S. did not 
receive enough support to sustain this position in the Rome Statute. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION'S THREE 
PROPOSALS FOR THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
The Commission's latest proposals for a statement of jurisdiction and 
a definition of the crime of aggression were released on July 6, 2000.79 
The document consolidates various proposals for the crime of aggres-
sion. 80 The following will discuss the two proposed options along with 
their variations. The history necessary to comprehensively understand 
the significance of each proposal along with the respective strengths and 
weaknesses of each option will also be provided. 
Two basic assumptions are made with respect to all of the options 
proposed, which, for the most part, have received widespread support.81 
The first is "the principle under which the crime of aggression is commit-
ted by political or military leaders of a State."82 This assumption pre-
cludes the trial of any terrorist regime, non-state party group, or individ-
ual of a state that acts contrary to the beliefs or purported views of the 
state itself where no possibility of trial exists before the ICC can act as a 
deterrent. 83 Underlying this principle is the idea that a state is its own 
sovereign and thus has the power to discipline and deal justly with its 
own citizens. 
The second assumption is "the principle that planning, preparation or 
ordering of aggression should be criminalized only when an act of ag-
gression takes place."84 Over the years, proponents have argued that by 
criminalizing aggression, many states will be prevented and deterred 
from committing such an act. However, under this assumption a person 
cannot be tried in the ICC for devising or scheming to commit a crime 
unless the planned act actually takes place. 
78. See id. at 15. 
79. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 8-9. 
80. See id. at II. 
81. See id. 
82. !d. 
83. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 444. 
84. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II. 
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A. Option 1 
1. Text common to all three variations 
Option 1 is comprised of a starting paragraph that branches into three 
variations. The text common to all three variations relies on the first as-
sumption given above85 as it states, "the crime of aggression means ... 
any of the following acts committed by [an individua1]86 who is in the 
position of exercising control or capable of directing the political or mili-
tary action of a state .... "87 
In addition, whether the Security Council will determine if the crime 
of aggression has been committed depends on the formula that is 
amended into the Rome Statute.88 The United States wants the Security 
Council to be the entity that determines whether an act of aggression has 
been committed. One obvious reason includes the fact that the U.S. is a 
permanent member of the Security Council, and thus could veto any trial 
for the crime of aggression it deems unworthy of prosecution. Therefore, 
the United States' concern over whether its military or political leaders 
would be subject to trial in the ICC for the crime of aggression would 
cease to exist. 
2. Variation 1 
Variation 1 of this option completes the definition by describing 
what the person in control must exactly initiate or carry out in order to 
qualify for committing a crime of aggression.89 The result of Variation 1 
is an overly-broad definition that fails to specify exactly what a person 
must do to be tried before the ICC.90 
85. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
86. The brackets contained around words in the options for the crime of aggression demon-
strate "different formulas than were suggested." Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 12. 
87. /d. at 8. 
88. See id. 
89. Full textofVariation 1: 
[an armed attack] [the use of armed force] [a war of aggression] [a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing) against an-
other State [against another State, or depriving other people of their rights to self-
determination], in [manifest] contravention of the Charter of the U.N., to violate [to 
threaten or to violate] the [sovereignty,] territorial integrity or political independence of 
that State [or the inalienable rights of those people] [except when this is required by the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and individual or collective 
rights of self-defense]. 
/d. at 8. 
90. See id. at II. 
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3. Variation 2 
Unlike Variation I of Option 1, Variation 2 specifies that the act of 
aggression must be "an armed attack directed by a State" and initiated or 
carried out "with the object or result of establishing a military occupation 
of, or annexing, the territory of such other State or part thereof."91 Under 
this variation, the definition of the crime of aggression is narrowed as the 
aim of the aggressor state must be to annex or occupy part of another 
state's territory.92 Thus, this variation of the crime of aggression may be 
an attempt to narrow the scope of the definition to encourage agreement. 
4. Variation 3 
Variation 3 of Option 1 includes the general definition-based para-
graph of Variation I and adds to it a paragraph that provides a specific 
list of acts which, when initiated or carried out by a control person, can 
be characterized as the crime of aggression.93 The listing of these specific 
acts originate from General Assembly Resolution 3314, passed on De-
cember 14, 1974.94 These acts provide concrete guidance by demonstrat-
ing what events may qualify persons to be tried for the crime of aggres-
sion. Among the listed acts listed are "[t]he invasion or attack by the 
armed forces of a State of a territory of another State,"95 and the "bom-
bardment"96 or "blockade ... of a State by the armed forces of another 
State ... :m 
Grant M. Dawson discusses why Resolution 3314 could be used to 
help define the crime of aggression in his article Defining Substantive 
Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court: What is the Crime of Aggression?98 One reason he gives 
is that although the ICC tries individuals,99 the act of an individual 
should not be disconnected from the act of a state. 100 The first assump-
tion given above with respect to the options listed is that those persons 
tried must be political or military leaders of a state. 101 As described 
91. /d.at8. 
92. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II. 
93. See id. at 9. 
94. See id. at II. 
95. /d. 
96. /d. 
97. /d. 
98. See generally Dawson, supra note 2. 
99. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. I. 
I 00. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 435. 
101. See supra note 82. 
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above, 102 Resolution 3314 was enacted to provide guidelines for the Se-
curity Council in determining when a state had committed an act of ag-
gression. Thus, by adopting Option 1, Variation 3, the specific acts de-
rived from Resolution 3314 can "be a guide for when the individuals in 
charge of a state's actions have committed the acts required for a finding 
of aggression." 103 
Another reason for adopting the provisions set forth in Resolution 
3314 is the added uniformity created by the use of familiar legal lan-
guage in the Resolution. For example, in the Resolution's definition of 
what constitutes prima facie evidence of an act of aggression, 104 the spe-
cific acts listed are similar to those found in a standard penal code. 105 
Thus, although the acts listed originate from a non-binding General As-
sembly resolution, the language of the Resolution adds certainty and uni-
formity to an inherently vague and hard-to-define crime. 
B. Option 2 
Option 2 states, "For the purposes of the present Statute and subject 
to a prior determination by the U.N. Security Council of an act of aggres-
sion by the State concerned, the crime of aggression means any of the 
following acts: planning, preparing, initiating or carrying out a war of 
aggression."106 Under this alternative and as discussed later, the Security 
Council determines whether an act of aggression by a state has occurred. 
The Security Council applies this determination to a definition of aggres-
sion derived from Article 6(a) of the Charter of the IMT of Nurem-
berg.107 Thus, this alternative integrates both the role of the Security 
Council along with the definition used in the Nuremberg trial. 
A problem inherent in Option 2 is its vague definition of what acts 
constitute aggression-a definition taken nearly word for word from Ar-
ticle 6(a) of the Charter of Nuremberg. What constitutes "planning, pre-
paring, initiating, or carrying out a war of aggression" 108 is subject to 
various interpretations. If only the above definition is used in determin-
ing whether a crime of aggression has occurred, then certain individuals 
may be dismissed while others who committed the same action are tried 
I 02. See supra note 69. 
103. Dawson, supra note 2, at 435. 
104. See id. at 435-36; see also G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 70, art. 2. 
105. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 436 (referring to G.A. Res. 3314, arts. I & 3). 
I 06. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 9. 
I 07. See id. at II. Article 6(a) of the Nuremberg Charter states that crimes against peace in-
clude the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of participation in a common 
plan .... "Nuremberg Charter, supra note 49, at 7. 
108. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 9. 
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before the ICC for purely political (or other) reasons. On the other hand, 
the Security Council may provide a check on the potential lack of uni-
formity as it must determine whether an act of aggression has occurred 
before an individual can be tried before the ICC. 109 In addition, by as-
suming that an act must actually have been committed before an individ-
ual may be prosecuted before the ICC for committing the crime of ag-
gression, 110 much of the uncertainty and the potential for lack of 
uniformity under this definition is diminished. 
C. Alternative 3: To Not Define Aggression 
Even while reviewing and being involved with the draft statutes, the 
United States opposed the inclusion of a qualitative definition of the 
crime of aggression. 111 The crime is hard to define and to categorize. In 
addition, the argument can be made that, pursuant to Chapter VII, the 
Security Council can punish states for aggression and the leaders of those 
states can be tried for other war crimes already defined in the Rome Stat-
ute.112 Thus, due to overlap, the crimes already defined in the Rome Stat-
ute negate the need to define the crime of aggression. 113 However, in-
cluding aggression as a crime encapsulates the history of international 
disapproval of waging aggressive war. 114 In fact, the IMT intentionally 
included and distinguished aggression from other crimes at Nurem-
berg.115 This viewpoint asserts that by excluding the crime of aggression, 
the Rome Statute will not "take into account the value of the criminaliza-
tion of the aggression itself." 116 
Another argument for the inclusion of the crime of aggression advo-
cates that "[a]ggressive war itself can lead to other core crimes, thus the 
initial prevention of war could accelerate compliance with other interna-
tional law." 117 However, the current proposals for a definition of the 
crime of aggression will not accelerate compliance because the assump-
tion made by all the proposed options is that the act must be committed 
before one can be tried for the crime. 118 
109. See id. at 9. 
II 0. See supra note 82. 
Ill. See Scheffer, supra note II, at 12-13. 
112. See Dawson, supra note 2, at 446. 
113. See id. 
114. See id. 
115. See supra note 53. 
116. Dawson, supra note 2, at 446. 
117. !d. at 447. 
118. See supra note 82. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION'S THREE PROPOSALS 
FOR THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION 
The report issued with respect to the Preparatory Commission's lat-
est proceedings at the Fifth Session attempts to consolidate into three op-
tions the views pertaining to the conditions for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion for the crime of aggression.119 All of the proposals attempt to 
address the authority of the Security Council to determine that an act of 
aggression of a state has occurred within the jurisdiction of the ICC by 
an individual purported to have committed the crime of aggression. In all 
three options, before the ICC may proceed against an individual, the Se-
curity Council must first have the discretion to determine whether the re-
lated state has committed an act of aggression. 
A. Option 1 
1. Text common to the two variations 
Option 1 states that the Security Council shall determine whether an 
act of aggression has been committed according to the rules of the U.N. 
Charter before any proceedings take place in the ICC. 120 It also states that 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is governed by Article 13 of the 
Rome Statute.121 Under Article 13, the Security Council, pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, may refer certain situations to the ICC 
in which it appears that admissible crimes have occurred. 122 Similarly, a 
state party may refer matters to the ICC in which admissible crimes have 
been violated under Article 14. 123 Furthermore, a prosecutor may take the 
initiative and investigate whether crimes have been committed. 124 How-
ever, after either receiving a referral from a state party or after an inves-
tigation has been initiated by an independent prosecutor, the ICC may 
not proceed under this option until the Security Council "first make[s] a 
decision establishing that an act of aggression has been committed by the 
State whose national is concemed."125 Thus, the difference between ju-
risdiction over other admissible crimes of the ICC and the crime of ag-
gression is that, under all three options, the Security Council must first 
119. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 12. 
120. See id. at 2. 
121. See id. at 10. 
122. See Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 13(b). 
123. See id. art. 13(a). 
124. See id. art. 13(c). 
125. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at I 0. 
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determine that an act of aggression by a state has been committed before 
the ICC may proceed. 126 Once a complaint regarding the crime of aggres-
sion has been received, the Security Council has either six or twelve 
months to determine whether the alleged act occurred. 127 
The underlying assumption of Option 1 is the "attempt to reflect 
views seeking to reconcile the prerogatives of the Security Council with 
the independence of the Court." 128 In addition, Article 5(2) of the Rome 
Statute states that jurisdiction over the crime of aggression shall be exer-
cised in harmony with relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter. 129 Thus, 
although the ICC "exercises its jurisdiction over persons on the crime of 
aggression," 130 the Security Council must first establish "the existence of 
an act of aggression."131 The reasoning includes that under Article 39 of 
the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is the entity responsible "for es-
tablishing the existence of an act of aggression." 132 Therefore, under this 
option, the Security Council should first determine that an act of aggres-
sion by the state has occurred before permitting a trial by the ICC for the 
0 f 0 133 cnme o aggressiOn. 
2. Variation 1 
Variation 1 simply adds that if the Security Council does not deter-
mine whether an act of aggression was committed within the time-frame 
allotted, the ICC may prosecute without the Security Council's ap-
proval.134 Also included in this variation is the assurance that, once de-
cided, the Security Council's determination of whether an act of aggres-
sion has occurred is totally separate and independent of the ICC's 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. 135 
3. Variation 2 
If the Security Council does not make a decision within the allotted 
time-frame, Variation 2 of Option 1 allows the ICC to request that the 
General Assembly, under Articles 12, 14, and 24 of the U.N. Charter, de-
126. See id. at I 0. 
127. See id. 
128. !d. at 12. As discussed above, relevant articles in the U.N. Charter and General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314 provide a framework for the Security Council to determine when an act of ag-
gression has occurred. 
129. See id. at 12; see also Rome Statute, supra note I, art. 5(2). 
130. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at 12 (emphasis added). 
131. !d. (emphasis added). 
132. !d. (emphasis added). 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at I 0. 
135. See id. 
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termine whether an act of aggression has occurred. 136 If the General As-
sembly does not make any recommendation within the proposed twelve-
month allotment, the ICC may then proceed without any consent. 137 This 
variation goes one step further than Variation 1 by providing that the ICC 
may proceed only after both the Security Council and General Assembly 
have failed to make a decision concerning the occurrence of an act of ag-
gression. However, such a decision becomes susceptible to political ma-
neuvering because the General Assembly is composed of delegates from 
the government of each member state of the U.N. and decisions are de-
termined by majority vote with each delegate casting one vote. Thus, 
whether one favors this variation depends upon one's political views on 
the subject of representation by a majority vote and whether or not one 
believes that the current majority view in the General Assembly is agree-
able to the state with which one is affiliated. 
B. Option 2 
The provisions of this option provide that the Security Council will 
determine whether a state committed an act of aggression in relation to 
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. 138 Article 39 states that the Security 
Council, at its discretion, may take action when peace among parties 
ceases to exist. 139 If not already determined by the Security Council, the 
ICC will request that the Security Council decide whether the state re-
lated to the crime of aggression in question has committed the act when a 
complaint of that crime is brought before it. 140 If the Security Council has 
not made a determination within twelve months after the ICC's request 
and has not renewed the request under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, 
the ICC may then proceed and exercise jurisdiction over the person. 141 
Thus, this option is similar to Option 1, Variation 1 in the sense that 
both basically provide for a prior Security Council determination if cer-
tain time constraints are met. 
C. Option 3 
This option is the same as the second option listed under the propos-
als for the definition of the crime of aggression 142 in that under both, the 
definition and the exercise of jurisdiction are intertwined and co-exist in 
136. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at I 0 & 12. 
137. See id. at 12. 
138. See id. at II. 
139. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
140. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II. 
141. See id. at 12. 
142. See supra text accompanying note 106. 
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this option. 143 The Nuremberg definition 144 for the crime of aggression is 
adopted "subject to a prior determination by the U.N. Security Council of 
an act of aggression by the State concerned." 145 As with the other two op-
tions, the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is subject 
to a prior determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression 
by the related state has occurred. However, under this option, no provi-
sions are made which indicate whether the ICC may proceed if the Secu-
rity Council fails to determine that an act of aggression by a state has oc-
curred. Thus, the ambiguity surrounding this option could potentially 
lead to a misuse of power. 
The idea underlying all of the Preparatory Commission's proposals is 
that the Security Council should make a prior determination that an act of 
aggression by a state has occurred before the ICC may proceed. By doing 
this, the ICC recognizes the function of the Security Council regarding 
the use of force and reconciles the state concept underlying the crime of 
aggression by which an individual may be charged. 
D. Alternative 4: No Security Council Determination 
Although not proposed in the Preparatory Commission's report at the 
Fifth Session, many have argued that the Security Council need not de-
termine whether the state concerned has committed an act of aggression 
with respect to a person tried before the ICC. Historical precedent for 
such an argument arises from the successful Nuremberg and Tokyo tri-
als.146 In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the 
U.S. had committed an act of aggression against Nicaragua in 1986 
without any determination of state aggression by the Security Counci1. 147 
Furthermore, because it is not deemed an international agreement, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 3314, which defines an act of aggression, is 
not binding law .148 Thus, under this proposal, the crime of aggression 
would be subject to the same jurisdictional limitations as other admissi-
ble crimes under the Rome Statute. 
Those in favor of this alternative could also argue that a prior Secu-
rity Council determination would shift the exercise of jurisdiction over 
this crime from an independent and neutral court (the ICC) to a political 
body (the Security Council or, perhaps, the General Assembly). How-
ever, due to the uncertainty regarding provisions pertinent to an inde-
143. See Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II n.2. 
144. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note 49, at 4. 
145. Proposed Statute, supra note 41, at II. 
146. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 167. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. at 166. 
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pendent state prosecutor, the ICC has the potential to become a political 
entity itself. 149 Thus, if a prior determination must be made by the Secu-
rity Council before a state party may refer a matter to the ICC or an in-
dependent prosecutor may itself investigate a potential claim, an added 
check is provided to help prevent the ICC from becoming political and 
corrupt. 
Another concern raised by requiring a prior Security Council deter-
mination is that, due to the veto power of the five permanent members of 
the Security Council, 150 any permanent member could preclude an "ac-
cused" person from adverse ICC action. This result seems likely, as the 
Security Council has rarely functioned efficiently or effectively in the 
past due to the diverse economic and political views of the five perma-
nent members. 151 Thus, although the Security Council has been instru-
mental in determining whether an act of aggression has occurred in the 
past, many arguments have been made against such a future ICC deter-
mination. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Although many states disapprove of aggression, history has demon-
strated that agreement upon what constitutes aggression is very difficult. 
Currently, Option 1, Variation 3 of the Preparatory Commission's pro-
posal provides the most guidance because it lists specific events that may 
qualify and help codify the crime. 
In addition, the latest proposals of the Preparatory Commission pro-
vide for a determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression 
of a state has occurred before the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the 
crime. By doing this, the ICC recognizes the function of the Security 
Council regarding the use of force and links the state concept of aggres-
sion to the individual who may be tried before the ICC for that crime. 
149. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
150. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 505 (3d ed. 1999). 
See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 23-32. 
151. See Springrose, supra note 42, at 161 (citation omitted). For an example of stagnancy in 
the Security Council during the Korean War once a permanent member disagreed with the stance 
taken, see LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND 
WORLD POLITICS 150-53 (3d ed. 2000). 
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Before the crime of aggression can ever be adopted into the Rome 
Statute, the definition must not only be detailed and expressed in a man-
ner that will enforce the idea that aggression is an inherent evil, it must 
also prevent the definition from being subject to political erosion. If 
amended into the Rome Statute, the crime statute's ability to perform its 
function is highly doubtful due to the inherent ambiguities and uncer-
tainty associated with both the definition of aggression and the Rome 
Statute's provisions regarding jurisdiction and amendments. 
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